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THE DRAFT UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT IN CONTEXT: CAN IT 
CLEAR UP THE CLUTTER?* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A clear analogy exists between the state of today’s mediation regulation 
and a typical attorney’s desk.  An attorney’s desk is full of memos and filings, 
projects and issues, all semi-sorted into piles, overlapping and spilling onto 
other piles of questions and proposed answers.  Unlabeled hanging file folders 
of voluminous subjects, each only partially complete yet filled to capacity, 
evidence incoherent attempts at organization.  Likewise, the attempt at 
regulating mediation among the states is unorganized, overlapping, incoherent, 
and incomplete.  What the proposed Draft Uniform Mediation Act1 attempts to 
do is sweep all the piles, folders, and files into the trash and replace them with 
one brand new, unwrinkled, neatly filled file folder of mediation regulation.2 
In the Summer of 1999, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”) 
disseminated for review the first proposed Draft Uniform Mediation Act 
(“Draft Act”).3  “If enacted and adopted uniformly, [the Draft Act] would 
 
* This Comment, by Bridget Genteman Hoy, was selected as the Best Student Work to appear in 
Volume 44 of the SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL. 
 1. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (Draft Mar. 2000) (visited Mar. 20, 2000) 
<http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/med300nc.htm> [hereinafter Draft Mar. 2000].  The 
first “integrated draft” was disseminated in June 1999.  UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (Draft June 
1999) (visited Feb. 21, 2000) <http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/drafts/june99.htm> 
[hereinafter Draft June 1999], reprinted in Richard C. Reuben & Nancy H. Rogers, Major Step 
Forward, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1999, at 9.  Substantial changes were made in the fall of 
1999 resulting in the December 1999 and January 2000 versions.  See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT 
(Draft Dec. 1999)  (visited Mar. 20, 2000)  <http.//www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/ 
/med1299.htm> [hereinafter Draft Dec. 1999]; UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (Draft Jan. 2000) 
(visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/med100.htm> [hereinafter 
Draft Jan. 2000].  The most recent version is the March 2000 draft.  The Draft Act will undergo 
an evaluation in April 2000 before being forwarded in final form to the NCCUSL in July 2000.  If 
approved by the NCCUSL, it will be forwarded to the ABA House of Delegates for final approval 
in February 2001. See Draft Unif. Mediation Act General Information (visited Feb. 18, 2000) 
<http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma/info.htm> [hereinafter Draft Act General Information]. 
 2. See Draft Act General Information, supra note 1; Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 18. 
 3. Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 18. 
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replace the hundreds of pages of complex and often conflicting statutes across 
the country with a few short pages of simple, accessible, and helpful rules.”4 
Abundant state regulation of mediation apparently reflects state policy 
makers’ special concern with quality mediation.5  As will be discussed in more 
detail in the following sections of this Comment, hundreds of state statutes, 
regulations, and rules address mediation in one form or another.6  The 
enormous body of law varies greatly with regard to the applicable contexts and 
the scope of regulation.7  California alone has eight statutes addressing 
mediator qualifications and ten statutes requiring mandatory use of mediation 
in business, family, agriculture, health and public contract disputes.8  In all, 
California has over 200 statutes and rules governing or addressing mediation.9  
The trend to extensively regulate mediation is not unique to California; nearly 
all states and the federal courts have regulated mediation in an attempt to 
ensure the quality of the process.10 
One of the major aims of the Draft Act is to provide for quality mediation 
procedures.11  The Draft Act “seeks to help assure the fairness of mediation, 
both in fact and in perception”12 by replacing the “tangle of legal requirements 
regarding mediation”13 with three concise mediation procedure provisions.14  
The Draft Act first requires that a mediator disclose any actual or potential 
conflict of interest.15  Second, the Draft Act provides that, if requested by a 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. MCEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 
2:04, at 17 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1998). 
 6. See id. § 13:01, at 1. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. app. B, at 153 (Supp. 1998). 
 9. ABA to Develop Model State Mediation Law, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 5 (1998). 
 10. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, at app. B.  See also John D. Feerick, Toward 
Uniform Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 456 (1997) (discussing 
Alternative Dispute Resolution programs in general and stating that in 1997 eighty out of ninety-
four federal district courts had instituted programs pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990). 
 11. Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9.  The other major focus of the Draft Act is 
confidentiality.  See id. § 4-8.  Confidentiality is considered a “cornerstone” of mediation due to 
the question of whether a mediator or mediating parties may testify as to mediation 
communications should subsequent litigation arise.  See Alan Kirtley, Best of Both Worlds, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Winter 1998, at 5.  “There are currently more than 250 state mediation 
confidentiality statutes, most of which vary greatly in terms of scope and application, even within 
a single state.”  Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 18.  A uniform act is advocated to provide 
confidentiality protection to all types of mediations and to “mend these holes in our national 
statutory fabric” so that a mediator in a state with confidentiality provisions does not have to fear 
being called to testify in another state lacking the same confidentiality protections.  Id. 
 12. Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 18. 
 13. Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 1. 
 14. Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9 (a), (b), and (c). 
 15. Id. § 9(a). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2000] THE DRAFT UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT IN CONTEXT 1123 
party, there must be disclosure of the mediator’s qualifications to mediate the 
dispute.16  Finally, the Draft Act attempts to ensure quality by upholding a 
disputant’s right to representation during mediation proceedings.17  In addition 
to these provisions, earlier versions of the Draft Act contained a clause 
declaring that there is no immunity from civil liability for mediators other than 
that provided under common law judicial immunity for court-connected 
mediators.18  The immunity provision, however, has since been deleted.  As 
currently written and if adopted by the states, the Draft Act’s provisions for 
quality mediation procedures will apply (1) when a dispute is referred or 
ordered to mediation by a court, government entity or mediator and (2) where 
the parties enter into a written or electronically recorded agreement to 
mediate.19 
This Comment discusses the Draft Act’s contextual applicability and its 
provisions for quality mediation procedures.20  Section II provides a historical 
overview of the institutionalization of mediation leading to the enactment of 
numerous state regulations and ultimately the drafting of a uniform act.  
Section III examines the scope of the Draft Act’s applicability and compares 
the provisions purporting to ensure quality mediation procedures with the 
existing state laws the Draft Act will attempt to replace.  In Section IV, this 
Comment turns to the questions of whether the Draft Act is aimed at the proper 
mediation contexts.  Where the Draft Act is aimed at the proper mediation 
contexts, this Comment will address whether the methods employed in the 
Draft Act can be effective without a loss of the advantages of mediation.  It 
will be argued that although uniform regulation ensuring quality procedures in 
court referred and court ordered mediation is well founded, the Draft Act may 
fail to unify the states on all salient issues, and it inappropriately applies to 
private mediation.  Finally, Section V concludes that the Draft Act is a 
commendable effort but its broad applicability may prevent it from clearing up 
the clutter of mediation regulation. 
II.  HISTORY: THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND REGULATION OF MEDIATION 
Mediation is an alternative to litigation where disputing parties agree to use 
an impartial third party to aid in the negotiation process.21  It is meant to be an 
 
 16. Id. § 9(b). 
 17. Id. § 9(c). 
 18. See Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1, § 3(b); Draft June 1999, supra note 1, § 4(b). 
 19. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1,  § 3 (defining mediation, mediator and disputant). 
 20. This Comment will not discuss the Confidentiality Provisions of the Draft Act.  For a 
discussion of the subject see ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 9:01, and Kirtley, supra note 
11. 
 21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 981 (6th ed. 1990).  Definitions of mediation have 
varying language; however, the definitions almost always encompass the aspects of (1) agreement 
of the parties to negotiate, (2) with the aid of a neutral mediator, and (3) in hopes of leading to a 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1124 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1121 
informal and simple process.22  The key is that a neutral person, a third party, 
or a person with no “direct stake” in the dispute aids, facilitates, or participates 
in the negotiations.23  The neutral party does not resolve the dispute, 
however.24  In fact, there is no guarantee that the dispute will be resolved at all 
through the mediation process since resolution depends on the voluntary 
consent and agreement of all disputing parties.25  If the dispute is resolved, 
however, and the parties reach an agreement, the written settlement contract 
has the same binding effect on the parties as any other compromise or 
settlement.  Thus, traditional contract principles control.26 
Compared to litigation, mediation has the potential of “reducing the cost, 
time, and stress of dispute resolution. . . . In appropriate cases, mediation 
provides parties with a simplified and economical procedure for obtaining 
prompt and equitable resolution of their disputes and a greater opportunity to 
participate directly.”27  Mediation tends to decrease the time it takes litigating 
 
consensual resolution.  See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 12 
(1994) (“Mediation is the process where the third party neutral, whether one person or more, acts 
as a facilitator to assist in resolving a dispute between two or more parties.”).  See also WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-43-101 (Michie 1977) (defining mediation as “a process in which an impartial 
third person facilitates communication between two (2) or more parties in conflict to promote 
reconciliation, settlement, compromise or understanding”); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-6-2-78 (West 
1999) (defining mediation as “a process where at least two (2) disputing parties choose to be 
guided to a mutually agreeable solution with the aid of a mediator”); ALA. CODE § 6-6-20 (1998) 
(stating that mediation means “a process in which a neutral third party assists the parties to a civil 
action in reaching their own settlement but does not have the authority to force the parties to 
accept a binding decision”).  However, some states have different definitions depending upon the 
context.  For example, Michigan defines medical malpractice mediation as a panel of five 
members who evaluate the dispute and make specific findings.  MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 
600.4905(1), 600.4915 (1996). 
 22. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s Grid, 
3 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 71, 92 (1998) (quoting Professor Lon Fuller who stated that “the central 
quality of mediation is its capacity to reorient the parties towards each other, not by imposing 
rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship”); 
ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 13:01, at 1. 
 23. SAM KAGEL & KATHY KELLY, THE ANATOMY OF MEDIATION: WHAT MAKES IT WORK 
185 (1989). 
 24. See Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A ‘Party Satisfaction’ Perspective on a 
Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885, 890 (1998) (stating that a 
mediator has no authority to impose a decision, as a judge or arbitrator can). 
 25. KAGEL & KELLY, supra note 23, at 190-92. 
 26. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 4:14.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4111 
(West Supp. 1999) (stating that if the parties to mediation agree to settle, “the agreement is 
enforceable as any other transaction or compromise”). 
 27. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775 (West 1982). 
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parties to reach a settlement;28 thus, it is favored for efficiency reasons.  On a 
more personal level, however, mediation is favored because it necessarily 
“produces a solution that is agreeable to everyone” due to its requirement of 
voluntary agreement to settle.29  The mediator’s role as a counselor to both 
parties acts as a “stabilizing, rational influence” giving the parties the 
opportunity to “openly vent their hostilities,”30 thereby leading to a general 
reduction of present and future conflict among the parties.31 
Mediation is said to reduce hostility and allow disputing parties to control 
the outcome rather than leaving the decision to an unrelated party’s binding 
determination.32  With an “emphasis on neutrality, individual responsibility, 
and mutual fairness,” it has been noted that “[m]ediation, as an alternative to 
the adversarial system, is less hemmed in by rules of procedure, substantive 
law, and precedent.”33  Thus, mediation allows the parties to find a resolution 
that suits them, even to the extent that the terms of the agreement are “wholly 
outside the realm of the law.”34  For instance, parties can agree to alternatives 
beyond the limited legal remedies in an effort to bring satisfaction to all 
involved.35 
 
 28. Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of 
Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831, 
837 (1998) [hereinafter Rogers & McEwen, Employing the Law]. 
 29. KAGEL & KELLY, supra note 23, at 191. 
 30. Deborah R. Sundermann, The Dilemma of Regulating Mediation, 22 HOUS. L. REV. 841, 
845 (1985). 
 31. Id. at 842, 864.  Despite general support, some disputes have been deemed inappropriate 
for mediation.  It has been argued that Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the 
landmark civil rights decision by the United States Supreme Court, is the paradigmatic example 
of a case inappropriate for mediation because the racial climate at the time would not have 
supported a voluntary end to segregation.  In addition, the constitutional precedent handed down 
by the Supreme Court would have been lost and would not have been available for subsequent 
civil rights cases.  Nonetheless, there is agreement that mediation is not necessarily inappropriate 
in all civil rights cases.  The decision of whether to litigate or mediate may depend on whether a 
precedent needs to be set or whether the parties want to “change custom and orientation at a 
deeper level . . . .”  Steven Keeva, When Mediation Doesn’t Work, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1999, at 88 
(quoting Margaret Herman, University of Georgia, Athens). 
 32. Sundermann, supra note 30, at 847. See also Guthrie & Levin, supra note 24, at 890 
(discussing party satisfaction in mediation). 
 33. Alison Smiley, Professional Codes and Neutral Lawyering: An Emerging Standard 
Governing Nonrepresentational Attorney Mediation, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 213, 217-18 
(1993). 
 34. Sundermann, supra note 30, at 847.  See also Smiley, supra note 33, at 217 (stating that 
parties are encouraged to “consider societal norms, applicable law, and other factors they deem 
relevant in reaching resolution”). 
 35. Sundermann, supra note 30, at 847.  “For example, if Aristotle accuses Brutus of 
vandalizing his house, but cannot legally prove it, Brutus can agree to ‘stop’ vandalizing the 
house if Aristotle will stop kicking Brutus’ dog.  The disputants and the mediator generate 
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The most basic form of mediation, two persons seeking the help of a third 
person to end a dispute, is claimed to be older than the Bible.36  In fact, use of 
mediation as the primary rather than the alternative means of conflict 
resolution can be traced to ancient China over two thousand years ago.37  
However, mediation contexts today have expanded beyond this raw form.  
They now include professional mediation services offered to the public by 
individuals purporting to be mediators by trade and to court referred and court 
ordered mediation programs, acting as a supplement to or replacement of the 
litigation process.  As discussed below, these newly created forms constitute 
the institutionalization of mediation and have spawned the extensive mediation 
regulation that exists today.38 
A. The Institutionalization of Mediation 
Although use of mediation likely existed in the United States from its 
beginnings when European colonists attempted to settle their own disputes, 
organized use of mediation first arose with the labor movement in the late 
1800s.39  In 1913, Congress created the Department of Labor and appointed the 
Secretary of Labor to act as mediator of labor and union disputes to expedite 
resolution and avoid strikes.40  With an increased need for mediation services, 
Congress then created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) 
in 1947.41  The FMCS had jurisdiction over and provided mediation for 
industry disputes affecting interstate commerce, private non-profit health 
facilities, and federal government agencies.42 
The use of mediation moved beyond labor and industry disputes in the 
1960s when the American Arbitration Association began establishing and 
privately funding neighborhood mediation projects.43  The projects provided 
low-cost dispute resolution services to the public as an alternative to litigating 
minor disputes.44  By the 1970s, several major cities had instituted similar 
mediation programs.45 
 
alternatives that arise from the totality of the specific facts.  The forum institution imposes no rule 
of law; no precedent is set or followed.”  Id. 
 36. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 18. 
 37. Id. at n.14. 
 38. See generally id. at ch. 2. 
 39. Id. at 18–20; ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 5:01, at 1. 
 40. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 20. 
 41. Id.  See also ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 5:01, at 1. 
 42. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 20. 
 43. See id. at 21; Sundermann, supra note 30, at 843. 
 44. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 21. 
 45. Sundermann, supra note 30, at 843.  See also KOVACH, supra note 21, at 21. 
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In the 1970s, the use of mediation “generated widespread attention among 
the public, bar, and judiciary.”46  Increased caseloads created a “renewed 
interest among jurists in the greater efficiency of consensual dispute resolution 
compared to traditional court processes,” and alternative methods of dispute 
resolution, as a part of the court system, were given a “fresh, hard look.”47  In 
1971, one of the first court sponsored mediation programs was created in 
Columbus, Ohio.48  Law Student mediators assisted in resolving minor 
criminal actions as part of the City Prosecutor’s Office.49  The concept was 
adopted in New York City in 1975 with the opening of the Institute for 
Mediation and Conflict Resolution.50 
Although these programs were praised and encouraged, the modern 
movement towards court sponsored mediation did not escalate until the Pound 
Conference in 1976.51  The Pound Conference focused on the perceived public 
dissatisfaction with the American legal system, including the overcrowded, 
expensive courts, and the participants of the Conference searched for ways to 
increase access to justice.52  As a result, Neighborhood Justice Centers, later 
renamed Dispute Resolution Centers, were created to provide mediation 
services at low cost to disputing parties after referral by local courts.53  Court 
referral to Dispute Resolution Centers led to the direct use of mediation in the 
court system, and “the idea of a ‘multi-door’ courthouse began to surface.”54  
Over time, legislatures began granting courts the authority to mandate that 
parties attempt mediation prior to, or as part of, the litigation process.55 
 
 46. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 5:02, at 4. 
 47. Id. (quoting Chief Justice Warren E. Burger from his remarks at the Arthur T. Vanderbilt 
dinner on November 18, 1982). 
 48. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 21. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. See also Legislation on Dispute Resolution, A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON DISP. 
RESOL. 2 (1990) [hereinafter Legislation 1990]. 
 52. Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through 
Courts and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 865, 866 & n.5 (1998); KOVACH, supra 
note 21, at 21. 
 53. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 22. 
 54. Id.  A “multi-door courthouse” is one in which an individual with a dispute can choose 
alternatives to the traditional litigation process.  Id.  See also ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, 
§ 5:03, at 12. 
 55. KOVACH, supra note 21, at 23, 48 (noting that federal courts often rely on Rule 16). The 
trend was especially prevalent in the family dispute arena.  Bobby Marzine Harges, Mediator 
Qualifications: The Trend Toward Professionalism, 1997 BYU L. REV. 687, 690 (1997). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1128 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1121 
B. Regulating Institutionalized Mediation 
The use of mediation in conjunction with the litigation process continued 
to increase, and consequently, numerous state regulations were enacted.56  New 
York passed the first court-related dispute resolution law, including specific 
mediation provisions, in 1981.57  The law gave New York courts the authority 
to “grant adjournments in contemplation of dismissal for certain criminal 
proceedings on the condition that the party(ies) participate in dispute 
resolution.”58  The law stated that mediators utilized in the program had to 
obtain twenty-five hours of training in conflict resolution and that all 
communications relating to the mediation were confidential.59 
The institutionalization of mediation was praised for its efficiency and cost 
effectiveness, and expansion of similar programs was advocated.60  At a 
dispute resolution conference in 1983, the Honorable Lawrence H. Cooke 
stated: 
Mediation . . . must move onward.  It must consider entering more 
comprehensively into less explored areas. . . . Undoubtedly, the most 
compelling need of mediation, if it is to function well, is that it be 
institutionalized.  Mediation must be incorporated into existing judicial 
structures.61 
Judge Cooke’s advice was apparently heeded.  By 1984, Colorado and 
Oklahoma had joined New York in passing comprehensive Dispute Resolution 
Acts instituting court related mediation programs,62 five states had adopted 
family and divorce mediation laws, and six states had appropriated state funds 
to mediation.63  The trend continued throughout the 1980s, and in 1990 the 
ABA Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution reported the existence of 
 
 56. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in Mediation – Requested, Recommended, or 
Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1997) (“As a catalyst for, and a result 
of, the expanded use of mediation, a plethora of laws have been enacted.”).  See also James J. 
Brudney, Mediation and Some Lessons from the Uniform State Law Experience, 13 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 795, 799-801 (1998) (discussing the “current regulatory setting”); ROGERS & 
MCEWEN, supra note 20, app. B (listing all state and federal statutes concerning mediation). 
 57. State Legislation on Dispute Resolution, A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ALTERNATIVE 
MEANS OF DISP. RESOL. 2 (1982)(citing S6369-B; Ch. 847 of the laws of 1981 and stating that 
“New York has the distinction of being the first and only state to pass a comprehensive dispute 
resolution law”).  Noted advantages of the law include its promotion of the “whole concept of 
mediation in New York.”  Id. at 3. 
 58. Id. at 4. 
 59. Id. at 4-5. 
 60. Lawrence H. Cooke, Mediation in the 80’s: Where are We Headed?, in PROBLEM 
SOLVING THROUGH MEDIATION 18 (Maria R. Volpe & Thomas F. Christian eds., 1984). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Legislation on Dispute Resolution, A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DISP. RESOL. 1 
(1984). 
 63. Id. 
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nearly 200 state statutes dealing with mediation.64  As stated in the 
Committee’s report, “in the 80’s [dispute resolution processes such as 
mediation] were rediscovered, expanded, and applied to almost every 
conceivable area capable of fomenting dispute”65 and “[t]he recent legislation 
boom is testament to its widespread acceptance.”66 
Between 1989 and 1993, mediation legislation increased from 517 pages of 
edited statutes to over 2000 individual state statutes concerning mediation.67  
Hundreds of the currently enacted state statutes are limited to provisions 
authorizing the use of mediation in given contexts68 or by state administrative 
agencies.69  Many others merely encourage the use of mediation70 or provide 
funding for state sponsored mediation centers.71  The remaining statutes 
purport to regulate everything from mediator qualifications to party privileges 
yet often apply to only court ordered or court referred mediation sessions.72 
This abundance of regulation has been criticized as confusing, incoherent, 
and complex.73  As stated by James Alfini, chair of the ABA Section of 
Dispute Resolution: “Those participating in mediation often face divergent 
provisions for different mediation contexts, even within the same state.”74  
Professor Joseph Stulberg75 stated that “while the use of mediation has 
expanded, a common understanding as to what constitutes mediation has 
weakened.  It is important . . . to identify and clarify the principles and 
 
 64. See Legislation 1990, supra note 51, at 1-2 (reporting 300 Alternative Dispute 
Resolution statutes of which 181 were mediation statutes). 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 4. 
 67. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 13.01. 
 68. Rogers & McEwen, Employing the Law, supra note 28, at 863. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 37:381 (West 1988) and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1824 (1992) (authorizing the board of the 
barbershop industry to act as mediator in any controversy between barbers); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit.  19-A § 1084 (West 1998) (allowing courts to refer grandparent visitation rights disputes 
to mediation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94A § 2 (1997) (granting the Commissioner the power to 
mediate disputes between milk producers and dealers). 
 69. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 4-21.5-3.5-1 (1999). 
 70. See, e.g., 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/1 (West 1999) (encouraging not-for-profit dispute 
resolution centers). 
 71. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-203 (Michie 1999). 
 72. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 13:02, at 4 and app. B. 
 73. See, e.g., Guthrie & Levin, supra note 24, at 885 (characterizing legislation as the 
“current patchwork of often confusing and conflicting mediation laws”). 
 74. Legal Groups Invite Comment on Draft of Proposed Uniform Mediation Act for States, 
U.S.L.W., Aug. 31, 1999, at 2127  [hereinafter Legal Groups]. 
 75. Joseph Stulberg is a professor of law and Director of Advanced Studies at the University 
of Missouri – Columbia School of Law.  See Brudney, supra note 56, at n. a1. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1130 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1121 
dynamics which together constitute mediation as a dispute settlement 
procedure.”76 
Within the past several years, the creation of a uniform act for mediation 
has been increasingly advocated.77  Nancy Rogers,78 a lead proponent of a 
uniform mediation act, gave three reasons supporting its inception: 
First, an act would present an opportunity to establish a level playing field.  
Second, it might increase the predictability and reliability of how the many 
states would deal with certain legal questions. . . .  Third . . . since many states 
have not examined statutory solutions, a uniform statute might provide for 
more thoughtful solutions.79 
In January of 1998, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws appointed a committee to draft a proposed uniform 
mediation act.80  The NCCUSL committee was appointed to work with the 
ABA Section of Dispute Resolution on the project.81  A paper presented at the 
August 1998 annual ABA meeting explained the need for a uniform mediation 
act: “Over the last 15 years, mediation-related law has grown from a few 
statutes to thousands of statutes, rules and regulations.  The person seeking to 
understand these laws faces formidable barriers.”82  The authors of that paper 
also stated that researching the reach of current mediation statutes is often 
difficult because the statutes take “diverse approaches for different types of 
disputes.”83 
Uniform acts are generally drafted by the NCCUSL to “promote 
uniformity in the law among the several states on subjects as to which 
uniformity is desirable and practicable.”84  The NCCUSL has done so in 
various areas, demonstrated by the overwhelming state acceptance of the 
Uniform Commercial Code,85 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,86 
 
 76. Kovach & Love, supra note 22, at 108 (citing Joseph Stulberg, The Theory and Practice 
of Mediation, 6 VT. L. REV. 85 (1981)) [hereinafter Stulberg, Theory and Practice]. 
 77. Legal Groups, supra note 74, at 2127 (stating that the drafting project began in the fall of 
1997). 
 78. Nancy Rogers is a professor of law and Vice Provost at the Ohio State University.  She 
also serves as the general coordinator of the Mediation Law Project.  Reuben & Rogers, supra 
note 1. 
 79. Christian Duve, Uniform Mediation Law: Do We Really Want Harmony?, 15 
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION 126 (1997). 
 80. ABA Meeting Examines Uniform Mediation Act, 53 DISP. RESOL. J. 6 (1998). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Brudney, supra note 56, at 796. 
 85. Adopted by all fifty states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.  Id. at 826. 
 86. Adopted by all fifty states, the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands.  Id. at 824. 
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the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,87 the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act,88 and many others.89 
The goal of a uniform act for mediation would be to add clarity to 
mediation regulation90 by “replac[ing] these statutes with a short and easily 
understandable statute that would provide important guidance on certain 
fundamental aspects of mediation, while at the same time permitting the 
flexibility that is so necessary to the process.”91  Consequently, a uniform act 
would be designed to “enhance, rather than interfere with, the expanded use of 
mediation and contribute to improving its effectiveness.”92 
The first version of the Draft Act was disseminated for review in June 
1999.93  After soliciting comments from legal and mediation professionals, the 
NCCUSL committee met again in October 1999 to incorporate suggestions, 
culminating in the December 1999 version of the Draft Act.94  The language 
and structure were fine-tuned in the January and March 2000 drafts, and the 
final draft is expected to be forwarded to the NCCUSL in July 2000.95  After 
approval, the proposed legislation will be forwarded to the ABA House of 
Delegates in February 2001 and then to the states for adoption.96  As stated by 
Professors Richard C. Reuben97 and Nancy H. Rogers,98 “the Uniform 
Mediation Act presents an unprecedented opportunity for the nation’s 
 
 87. Adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.  Id. at 825. 
 88. Adopted by forty-six states.  Id. at 828. 
 89. See Brudney, supra note 56, at 827-29.  Not all proposed uniform acts have been 
immediately successful.  For example, although the current Uniform Arbitration Act has been in 
existence for forty-two years and has been adopted by thirty-five states, its success was not easily 
achieved.  4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 28 (1995).  The first attempt at a 
Uniform Arbitration Act failed, and it was ultimately deemed inactive in 1943.  Id. at n.45.  In 
1957, however, a second Uniform Arbitration Act was attempted, and it was steadily adopted by 
the states over the following years.  See Brudney, supra note 56, at 827. 
 90. Michael B. Getty et al., Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation Act: 
Preface, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 787 (1998). 
 91. Legal Groups, supra note 74, at 2127. 
 92. Getty et al., supra note 90, at 788. 
 93. See Draft Act General Information, supra note 1; Draft June 1999, supra note 1. 
 94. See Draft Act General Information, supra note 1; Draft  Dec. 1999, supra note 1. 
 95. See Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1; Draft Mar. 2000 supra note 1; Draft Act General 
Information, supra note 1; Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 19.  The Conference will decide by 
vote of state representatives, one vote per state, whether to promulgate the draft as a uniform act.  
It must be approved by a majority vote.  Brudney, supra note 56, at 798-99. 
 96. See Draft Act General Information, supra note 1; Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 19.  
See also Brudney, supra note 56, at 809-13 (discussing various themes of successful adoption). 
 97. Richard C. Reuben is a senior research fellow at the Harvard Negotiation Research 
Project at Harvard Law School and the Reporter for the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution 
Drafting Committee.  See Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 19. 
 98. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
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mediation community to elevate the field by working together to craft minimal 
but meaningful protections for the process and its participants.”99 
III.  THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THE PROMISE OF THE DRAFT ACT 
As stated in the Introduction to this Comment, the Draft Act’s definitions 
of disputant, mediation, and mediator form the contexts in which the Draft Act 
is to apply.  The Draft Act states that 
(a)”Disputant” means a person who participates in mediation and: 
(1) has an interest in the outcome of the dispute or whose agreement is 
necessary to resolve the dispute, and 
(2) is asked by a court, government entity, or mediator to appear for 
mediation or entered an agreement to mediate that is evidenced by a 
record.100 
(b) “Mediation” means a process in which disputants in a controversy, with the 
assistance of a mediator, negotiate toward a resolution of the conflict that will 
be the disputant’s decision.101 
. . . 
(d) “Mediator” means an impartial individual of any profession or background, 
who is appointed by a court or government entity or engaged by disputants 
through an agreement evidenced by a record.102 
By these definitions, the Draft Act purports to regulate mediation in two 
very broad contexts: (1) private mediation in which the parties enter into a 
written or electronically recorded agreement and (2) court or government 
sponsored mediation.103  Further, the Draft Act does not distinguish between 
types of disputes, for instance domestic and criminal or business and 
agricultural, but instead applies uniformly to all disputes.104 
Generally, the states have not taken a similar approach.  Many state 
statutes apply only to court referred or court ordered mediation,105 granting 
courts the authority to refer or order disputes to mediation and then setting 
 
 99. Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 19. 
 100. Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 3(a).  “Record” is defined as “information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is 
retrievable in perceivable form.”  Id. § 3(g). 
 101. Id. § 3(b). 
 102. Id. § 3(d). 
 103. See id. § 3. 
 104. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1,  § 3. 
 105. Court ordered or court referred mediation is also commonly referred to as court-annexed 
or mandatory mediation.  See Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines 
for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1091-96 (1990) [hereinafter 
Mandatory Mediation]. 
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guidelines and standards for the court-connected mediation sessions.106  As 
discussed in conjunction with the quality provisions to follow, many states 
require confidentiality, disclosure, and mediator immunity when mediation is a 
result of a court referral or order.107 
Likewise, few states have enacted comprehensive mediation acts 
applicable to all types of disputes.108  Legislation is more often categorized in 
accordance with substantive law.109  For instance, the California Code contains 
separate provisions for family,110 labor,111 attorney discipline,112 truancy,113 
planning and zoning,114 water rights,115 unemployment compensation,116 
Native American historical site disputes117 and more.118 
It is claimed that distinct provisions may better address subject-specific 
issues.119  The regulation of family dispute mediation illustrates this claim.  
Divorce, child custody, paternity and other family disputes likely involve 
emotional as well as legal issues.120  Therefore, the issue of attorney 
representation is unique in that bargaining power may be greatly unbalanced 
and the parties’ view of economic concerns may be fogged by emotions.121  In 
addition, mediator qualifications are especially significant because divorce, 
domestic violence, and child custody mediations may include an aspect of 
counseling.122  In fact, many states have exempted domestic violence cases 
from mandatory dispute programs due to the sensitive issues raised.123  
Emotions and counseling may not weigh as heavily in non-domestic disputes 
 
 106. Id. n. 34 (citing for example MINN. STAT. § 484.74 (1990)). 
 107. See generally id. (discussing ways to ensure fair and efficient mandatory mediation 
programs). 
 108. But see Louisiana Mediation Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4101 - 4112 (West Supp. 
1999) and Kansas Dispute Resolution Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-501 – 5-516 (1995). 
 109. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12 (discussing issues related to specific types 
of disputes which justify including mediation statutes within substantive laws). 
 110. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3160-3161 (West 1994). 
 111. CAL. LAB. CODE § 65 (West 1989). 
 112. CAL. BUS. & PROF.  CODE § 6086.14 (West 1990). 
 113. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 601.3 (West 1998). 
 114. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66031 (West 1997). 
 115. CAL. WATER. CODE § 1219 (West 1971). 
 116. CAL. UNEMPL. INS. § 1282 (West 1986). 
 117. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5097.94 (West 1984). 
 118. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 13.01, at 2 & app. B. 
 119. Professor Stulberg of the University of Missouri-Columbia argues against a uniform 
mediation law because of the complication created by the broad variety of fields where mediation 
is applied. See Duve, supra note 79.  See also ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12. 
 120. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12:02. 
 121. Id. § 12:02, at 2-3. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. § 12:02, at 9. 
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such as business or corporate disputes, thus making attorney representation and 
qualifications less of an issue.124 
Another example of the professed need for subject-specific regulation is 
within the labor and employment field.  States such as California, Connecticut, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, and North Carolina make distinctions 
between labor and other types of disputes when regulating for 
confidentiality.125  For labor disputes, confidentiality requirements apply only 
to the mediator or mediation agency and not to all mediation communication; 
in other types of disputes, confidentiality applies to all parties.126 
Nonetheless, there has been some attempt among the states to regulate 
varying disputes in a more uniform fashion than provided in subject-specific 
regimes.  For instance, in Kansas, separate statutory provisions existed to 
regulate mediation confidentiality for employment, child custody, and 
environmental disputes.127  However, in 1996, the Kansas legislature amended 
the various statutes to reflect identical provisions.128 
Instead of a subject-specific approach, the drafters of the Draft Act 
attempted to maintain a broad focus, covering only those aspects of mediation 
common to all types of disputes while leaving flexibility for local variations 
and supplements.129  In doing so, the Draft Act has three concise provisions to 
ensure quality mediation procedures in all types of disputes.130  The Draft Act 
requires mediator disclosure of any conflicts of interest,131 provides for 
disclosure of mediator qualifications when requested,132 and ensures a party’s 
right to representation.133  Although not included in the current version of the 
Draft Act, previous versions limited mediator immunity to common law 
immunity for court-connected mediators.134  In the following sections, this 
Comment will explore the Draft Act quality provisions and offer a comparison 
between them and the closely related state laws already in effect, paying 
particular attention to contextual applicability. 
 
 124. Compare ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12:02, with id. ch. 12:03. 
 125. Id. § 12:08, at 29 & n.5. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12:01, at 1. 
 128. Id. § 13:02, at 111. 
 129. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 1. 
 130. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1,  § 9 (formerly section 3 of the January version and 
section 4 of the June and December versions). 
 131. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1,  § 9(a). 
 132. See id. § 9(b). 
 133. See id. § 9(c). 
 134. See Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1,  § 3(b). 
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A. Disclosure 
The Draft Act contains two disclosure provisions; one pertaining to 
conflicts of interest disclosure and the other to qualifications disclosure.  The 
conflicts of interest provision states: 
Before accepting appointment or engagement a mediator shall make an inquiry 
that is reasonable under the circumstances to determine whether there are any 
facts that a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the impartiality of 
the mediator, including any financial or personal interest in the outcome of the 
mediation or existing or past relationships with a disputant or any known or 
foreseeable participant in the mediation.135 
Regarding qualifications, the Draft Act requires that “[i]f asked by a disputant, 
a mediator shall disclose the mediator’s qualifications to mediate a dispute.”136 
The first version of the Draft Act differed from the subsequent versions in 
that it required the parties to request disclosure of both conflicts of interest and 
qualifications prior to obligating the mediator to disclose the information.137  
The current version, as stated, mandates disclosure of conflicts of interest in 
the absence of a request while disclosure of qualifications is only required 
upon request.138  The change was apparently made due to the importance of the 
knowledge of a conflict of interest prior to mediation.139  The drafters contend, 
in the Reporter’s Notes to the section, that requiring disclosure of conflicts of 
interest and, upon request, qualifications, “sets a minimum standard.”140  They 
further contend that the disclosure requirement, applicable to both court-
connected and private mediators, “promot[es] the market place as a check on 
quality among prospective mediation clients.”141 
It should be noted that the Draft Act “does not establish or call for 
mediator qualifications” due to the wide variance in what qualifies a mediator 
for a given dispute.142  The Reporter’s Notes state that “[q]ualifications may be 
important, but they need not be uniform” due to the variety of contexts in 
which the Draft Act will apply and the “unique characteristics that may qualify 
a particular mediator for a particular mediation.”143 
Like the Draft Act, some states have attempted to regulate the quality of 
mediation by requiring disclosure in certain mediation contexts.144  In the 
 
 135. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1,  § 9(a). 
 136. Id. § 9(b). 
 137. Draft June 1999, supra note 1, § 4(a). 
 138. See Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1,  § 3(a). 
 139. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(a). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-58.2 (Michie 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:4107 (West Supp. 1999). 
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following sections, state regulation regarding disclosure of conflicts of 
interests and disclosure of qualifications will be discussed in turn. 
1. Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest 
It is claimed that disclosure of potential conflicts of interest increases 
parties’ confidence in the process by ensuring impartiality.145  In a South 
Dakota statute, the legislature proclaimed that because mediation is based on 
“participation and self-determination of the parties,”146 the parties’ confidence 
in the mediator and willingness to cooperate is important, and knowledge that 
the mediator is impartial may increase the parties’ acceptance of the process.  
Based on that principle, South Dakota requires that family court mediators 
“fully disclose to all parties involved in the mediation any actual or potential 
conflicts of interest.”147  Self-withdrawal is expected if the mediator believes 
that impartiality is impossible or if either party requests withdrawal after full 
disclosure.148 
Louisiana has a similar provision requiring disclosure of potential conflicts 
of interest.149  As part of the Louisiana Mediation Act,150 upon motion of both 
parties to a dispute, the court may refer a civil case to mediation and the 
assigned mediator is required to disclose “all past or present conflicts or 
relationships with the parties or their counsel.”151  Likewise, in a very narrowly 
applicable statute, Vermont requires disclosure of conflicts of interest by 
mediators in mobile home park disputes.152  The statute identifies potential 
conflicts of interest as “any experience as a mobile home park owner, resident 
or leaseholder.”153 
In addition to these state statutes, the Model Standards of Conduct for 
Mediators (“Model Standards”), developed jointly by the ABA, American 
Arbitration Association, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution, advanced a concept similar to the Draft Act’s disclosure 
provision.154  The Model Standards, intended to be guidelines for mediators 
and to encourage high quality mediation,155 suggest that “a mediator shall 
 
 145. Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 53 (1996). 
 146. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-58.2 (Michie 1999). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4107 (West Supp. 1999). 
 150. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4101- 4112 (West Supp. 1999). 
 151. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4107. 
 152. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,  § 6252 (1997). 
 153. Id.  Regulation of this type of conflict, a perceived conflict stemming from closeness in 
circumstances, is referred to as “restriction.” See Silver, supra note 145, at 53–56. 
 154. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, reprinted in Feerick, supra note 10, at 478. 
 155. Id. at 459. 
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disclose all actual and potential conflicts of interest reasonably known to the 
mediator” and then decline to act as the mediator if any party does not 
consent.156  The Model Standards state that especially sensitive conflicts of 
interest, which should be disclosed in all cases, include past personal or 
professional relationships with the disputants or the attorneys and a financial or 
personal interest in the outcome of the mediation.157 
2. Disclosure of Qualifications 
Disclosure of qualifications, compared to disclosure of conflicts of interest, 
has been called a more novel requirement.158  Very few states require 
disclosure of qualifications.  One of the few examples is the Louisiana 
Mediation Act. 159  It requires disclosure of professional qualifications for court 
appointed mediators and states that “upon receiving notice of appointment as a 
mediator in a particular proceeding, the mediator shall make available to all 
parties a list of his professional qualifications, curriculum vitae, and fee 
schedule.”160 
Regardless of disclosure requirements, qualification standards have been 
deemed “[o]ne of the most controversial issues in the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) field.”161  Yet, among forty states there are over one 
hundred statutes requiring entry-level mediator qualifications in at least some 
types of court referred or court ordered mediation.162  However, there is no real 
similarity among the states; some regulations require certain educational 
degrees, others merely require experience.163 
For example, the Florida Standards of Professional Conduct require 
mediators to acquire knowledge and training in the mediation process and to 
understand the appropriate professional ethics standards, but it does not 
enumerate standards of qualification.164  Conversely, the Louisiana Mediation 
Act requires forty hours of classroom training in mediation and, if not licensed 
to practice law, 500 hours of dispute resolution prior to being appointed as a 
qualified mediator.165 
 
 156. Id. at 464. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(a). 
 159. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4107. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Harges, supra note 55, at 687. 
 162. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 11:02, at 4.  Note that most qualification 
statutes apply only in child custody disputes.  See Paul F. Devine, Mediator Qualifications: Are 
Ethical Standards Enough to Protect the Client?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 187, 204 (1993). 
 163. Devine, supra note 162, at 204. 
 164. FLA. STAT. ANN. Mediator Rule 10.120 (West 1992). 
 165. LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4106A (West Supp. 1999).  The Louisiana Mediation Act also 
requires that a qualified mediator participate in ten hours of annual training to maintain a listing 
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California alone has an abundance of qualifications which vary depending 
upon the nature and context of the dispute.166  The California Rules of Court 
provide that court-connected mediators of child custody and visitation disputes 
should “undergo a minimum of 40 hours of mediation training within their first 
six months of employment,” have two years experience in court mediation, 
demonstrate competence, and meet the statutory education and experience 
qualifications.167  The statutory qualifications of the California Family Code 
require: 
(1) A master’s degree in psychology, social work, marriage, family and child 
counseling, or other behavioral science substantially related to marriage and 
family interpersonal relationships. 
(2) At least two years of experience in counseling or psychotherapy, or both, 
preferably in a setting related to the areas of responsibility of the family 
conciliation court and with the ethnic population to be served. 
(3) Knowledge of the court system of California and the procedures used in 
family law cases. 
(4) Knowledge of other resources in the community to which clients can be 
referred for assistance. 
(5) Knowledge of adult psychopathology and the psychology of families. 
(6) Knowledge of child development, child abuse, clinical issues relating to 
children, the effects of divorce on children, the effects of domestic violence on 
children, and child custody research sufficient to enable a counselor to assess 
the mental health needs of children.168 
Apart from family disputes, California requires mediators of certain 
prisoner civil rights issues to “be a member in good standing of the Bar . . . 
 
on the approved register of qualified mediators.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4106B (West Supp. 
1999). 
 166. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, app. B at 152-55. 
 167. CAL. R. OF CT. § 26(e). 
 168. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1815(a) (West 1994) (applying to mediators by reference of CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 3164 (West 1994)). Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 552.513(4) (1988) (a less 
rigorous domestic dispute which requires “(a) One or more of the following: (i) A license or a 
limited license to engage in the practice of psychology . . .  or a master’s degree in counseling, 
social work, or marriage and family counseling . . . (ii) Not less than 5 years of experience in 
family counseling . . . (iii) A graduate degree in behavioral science and successful completion of a 
domestic relations mediation training program with not less than 40 hours of classroom 
instruction and 250 hours of practical experience . . . (iv) Membership in the state bar of 
Michigan . . . (b) Knowledge of the court system of this state and the procedures used in domestic 
relations matters (c)Knowledge of other resources in the community to which the parties to a 
domestic relations matter can be referred for assistance (d) Knowledge of child development, 
clinical issues relating to children, the effects of divorce on children, and child custody 
research”); and KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-602 (1995) (requiring only mediation training and 
knowledge of the judicial system with no degree requirement). See also Devine, supra note 162, 
at 201-07 (discussing existing standards of qualifications including skills testing, ethical codes 
and state laws). 
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with at least 10 years legal practice experience.”169  Under the California Water 
Code, disputes between a water supplier and water users may be mediated by a 
mutually agreeable mediator or selected from an appointed panel of 
“disinterested persons” through a process of elimination.170  Finally, several 
other California statutes leave selection and qualifications of the mediator 
solely to the parties with no mandatory qualifications imposed.171 
The propriety of set qualifications has been questioned.  Some argue that 
instead of or perhaps in addition to training, mediators should be required to 
pass a performance test based on a mock mediation evaluation.172  It is argued 
that a test would best evaluate the interactive skills of the mediator because the 
mediator’s ability to investigate, display empathy, be inventive and persuasive, 
and avoid distractions is more important than any academic skills.173  The cost 
of administering such a test is prohibitive however, and states have generally 
confined regulation to the imposition of qualification standards.174 
The proponents of qualification standards argue that, unlike judges and 
arbitrators, mediators do not necessarily have either legal or area expertise to 
ensure the quality of the services they provide.175  In addition, there is no 
“backup scrutiny of appellate review” to legitimize the function of the 
mediator.176  In an attempt to ensure a certain level of quality, legislatures are 
urged to impose requirements on mediators, including certification, training, 
ethics codes and professional standards.177  However, the “differing visions of 
what mediation is and should be translate into varying views about mediation 
training, qualifications, and ethics.”178  The only real consensus on what 
creates a qualified mediator is that “something is required.”179 
 
 169. U.S. DIST. CT. RULES C.D. CAL., Pilot Prisoner Mediation Program. 
 170. CAL. WATER CODE § 1219 (West 1971). 
 171. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66031 (West 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1775.6 
(West 1982). 
 172. Mandatory Mediation, supra note 105, at 1101. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Kovach & Love, supra note 22, at 104.  “Mediators in the early programs came from all 
walks of life.  They were ‘community organizers, business persons, attorneys, social workers, 
teachers, senior citizens, and homemakers.’” Harges, supra note 55, at 690. 
 176. Kovach & Love, supra note 22, at 104. 
 177. Mandatory Mediation, supra note 105, at 1101. 
 178. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 2:04, at 19. 
 179. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(a) (emphasis added).  Note also 
that some scholars claim all that is required to be “qualified” is the ability to be impartial.  See 
Silver, supra note 145, at 45. 
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B. Right to Representation 
The third mediation procedure provision of the Draft Act ensures a party’s 
right to be represented at a mediation proceeding.180  It states that “[a] 
disputant has the right to have an attorney or other individual designated by the 
disputant attend and participate in the mediation.  A waiver of this right may be 
revoked.”181  The drafters contend that an absolute right to representation is 
justified because “[t]he fairness of mediation is premised upon the informed 
consent of the disputants to any agreement reached.”182  Therefore, rather than 
allow the mediator to decide whether attorney representation is appropriate, the 
Draft Act leaves the decision to the disputants themselves.183  In addition, 
under the Draft Act’s language the disputants have the option to be represented 
by a non-lawyer.184  The drafters claim that this will act as another tool to 
balance negotiating powers.185 
There is some disagreement in the mediation community as to whether the 
attendance or absence of attorneys advances the quality of the mediation.186  In 
favor of attorney representation, it is argued that by providing the information 
needed to make an informed decision about the resolution of a dispute, an 
attorney’s presence aids the client.187  In this view, attorneys “act as a crucial 
check against uninformed and pressured settlement . . . .”188  An attorney can 
provide an opinion as to the strength of the other party’s argument or the 
fairness of a proposal.189  In addition, an attorney can speak for a nervous or 
intimidated client who is unable to forward his or her own position with 
confidence, thereby mitigating an imbalance of bargaining power among the 
parties.190 
Further, as a method of increasing the use of mediation, it is argued that 
“encouragement of lawyer participation in mediation [i]s a means to influence 
lawyers to recommend mediation to their clients . . . .”191  Once an attorney is 
aware of the advantages of mediation and the potential for faster, less 
 
 180. Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9(c). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(c) (citing Joseph B. Stulberg, 
Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 909, 936-44 (1998)). 
 183. Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(c). 
 184. Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9(c); Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 
4(c). 
 185. Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(c). 
 186. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 2:04, at 18-19. 
 187. See Rogers & McEwen, Employing the Law, supra note 28, at 854. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using 
Economics and Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 269, 345-48 (1999). 
 190. Id. 
 191. See Rogers & McEwen, Employing the Law, supra note 28, at 853. 
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expensive dispute resolution, the attorney is more likely to encourage 
mediation over traditional litigation.192  Therefore, some have concluded that 
having lawyers present can “protect against unfairness and, at the same time, 
the process makes them more effective at recommending mediation.”193 
Not all scholars advocate right to representation laws.  Opponents claim 
that an attorney’s presence detracts from the parties’ ability to control the 
outcome of the dispute.194  Mediation is said to “empower”195 parties because it 
gives them control over the dispute resolution process.  It is claimed that 
attorney presence reduces party empowerment due to “the presumed loss of 
control that results when lawyers ‘take over’ a case.”196  The split in views on 
the propriety of right to representation laws has resulted in a split in state 
statutes.  Some state regulations uphold the right to representation in mediation 
negotiations197 while others mandate the absence of all non-parties to the 
dispute.198  The differences often depend upon the nature of the dispute; 
however, even within one category of dispute, namely domestic mediation, 
there is no real consensus among the states.199 
Mediation of family disputes is one example of the disparity in right to 
representation laws.  Kansas expressly allows only the parties to attend 
mediation sessions concerning domestic disputes.200  Other states, California 
and South Dakota for instance, do not entirely exclude attorneys from domestic 
mediations, but give the mediator the authority to exclude attorneys if the 
mediator so chooses.201  Alaska and North Dakota statutes prohibit a mediator 
from excluding an attorney.202  Regardless, it has been noted that even where 
allowed, “lawyers for the parties [in family disputes] do not attend 
 
 192. Id. at 844. 
 193. Id. at 854. 
 194. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 2:04, at 18-19. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. (citing ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994)). 
 197. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060(c) (Michie 1998). 
 198. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 162.959(9) (Supp. 1999) (prohibiting attorney participation 
at special education mediation sessions). 
 199. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12:02, at 3 (discussing “prolawyer and antilawyer 
sentiments” in domestic dispute mediation). 
 200. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-603(6) (1995). 
 201. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182(a) (West 1994) (allowing the mediator of custody and 
visitation disputes to exclude counsel “if, in the mediator’s discretion, exclusion of counsel is 
appropriate or necessary”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-59 (Michie 1999) (stating that the 
mediator may exclude counsel from divorce and separate maintenance mediation proceedings). 
 202. The Alaska statute for divorce and annulment states that counsel for the parties may 
attend all mediation conferences.  ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.060(c) (Michie 1998).  The North 
Dakota statute states “the mediator may not exclude counsel from participation in the [contested 
child] mediation proceedings.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-05 (1996).  See also OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 107.785(1) (1983); WIS. STAT. § 767.11(10)(a)(West 1993). 
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mediation . . . .”203  In fact, “only 14% of domestic court mediation 
programs . . . report that lawyers attend most mediation sessions.”204  In any 
event, as with other forms of regulation for quality mediation, right to 
representation laws vary depending upon the state and the type of dispute. 
C. Mediator Immunity 
Previous versions of the Draft Act purported to ensure quality mediation 
through a mediator immunity clause.205  The first version of the Draft Act 
approached the issue from the standpoint of contractual disclaimers, also 
known as exculpatory agreements.206  It stated: “Unless immunity from 
liability is extended to mediators by common law, rules of court, or other law 
of this State, a contractual term purporting to disclaim a mediator’s liability is 
void as a matter of public policy.”207  However, later versions of the Draft Act 
narrowed the provision from allowing immunity in any context covered by 
state common or statutory law to only common law judicial immunity for 
court-connected mediators.  These provisions stated that “[u]nless mediators 
fall within common law protections extending judicial immunity, no immunity 
may be extended to mediators specifically for their conduct related to 
mediation . . . .”208  The immunity provision has since been eliminated entirely 
from the Draft Act.209 
In the earlier versions, the drafters claimed to take an approach which 
“diminishe[d] any non-judicial immunity that a mediator may enjoy under 
current state law,” thereby putting mediators “on the same footing as lawyers 
 
 203. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 12:02, at 3. 
 204. ROGERS & MCEWEN, Employing the Law, supra note 28, at 864 n.134. 
 205. Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1,  § 3(b). 
 206. An exculpatory agreement is one which “releases one of the parties from liability for his 
or her wrongful acts.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 566 (6th ed. 1990). 
 207. Draft June 1999, supra note 1, § 4(b).  It is common for exculpatory agreements to be 
deemed against public policy in contexts other than mediation.  See Arthur A. Chaykin, The 
Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile Environment for Model Legislation, 2 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 47, 77 (1986) (noting that “granting of an immunity is a matter of public 
policy that balances the social utility of the immunity against the social loss of being unable to 
attack the immune defendant”).  In Wisconsin, for instance, the supreme court has enumerated 
circumstances in which an exculpatory agreement will never be enforceable.  Alexander T. 
Pendleton, Enforceable Exculpatory Agreement, 70 WIS. LAW. 10, 11 (Nov. 1997).  Such 
circumstances include excuse of intentionally or recklessly inflicted harm, an employer’s liability 
for injury to an employee in the course of the employee’s employment, liability by a party 
“charged with performing a service of great importance to the public,” and liability of a party 
with a decisive advantage in bargaining strength.  Id. 
 208. Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1,  § 3(b).  The provision also states that “in an action against 
a mediator arising out of conduct of the mediation session, reasonable attorney’s fees and other 
expenses of litigation may be awarded to a prevailing defendant.”  Id. 
 209. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1. 
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who are prohibited by professional ethics from disclaiming liability.”210  They 
claimed that “mediators who disclose in violation of statutory provisions, who 
hide conflicts of interest, or who exclude legal counsel from the sessions over 
the objection of disputants should be accountable to disputants who are 
hurt.”211  However, the drafters further contended that court-connected 
mediators pose less of a threat of lack of accountability than private mediators 
due to court supervision; therefore, they initially did not object to common law 
immunity for judicial mediators.212 
Some mediation scholars argue that mediating parties are protected by 
liability imposed through traditional tort and contract causes of action.213  A 
party dissatisfied with a mediator’s services may have an action for false 
advertising, breach of contract, slander, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent 
performance of duties, defamation or deceptive practice.214  Professor Arthur 
A. Chaykin215 argues that with the increased use of mediation, the various 
types of disputes mediated, and the often emotional or hostile disputes 
mediators face, it is inevitable that mediators will be sued.216  The imposition 
of liability can have a “salutory impact on an industry, assuring that certain 
levels of quality are maintained . . . .”217  Therefore, he argues that special 
immunities for mediators are likely unnecessary.218 
Despite the potential need advocated by some mediation scholars to ensure 
quality mediation through mediator liability,219 several states have enacted 
mediator immunity laws negating any liability that may have applied.  For 
example, Arizona law states that “a mediator is not subject to civil liability 
except for those acts or omissions that involve intentional misconduct or 
reckless disregard of a substantial risk of a significant injury to the rights of 
others.”220  As part of a general Courts and Civil Proceedings statute, the law 
governs all mediation “pursuant to law, a court order or a voluntary decision of 
the parties.”221 
Many immunity statutes apply only to court-connected mediation.  For 
example, the Colorado Dispute Resolution Act creates judicial dispute 
 
 210. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(b). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Chaykin, supra note 207, at 50-51. 
 214. Id.  See also Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators 
Can Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 629, 630 (1997). 
 215. Professor Chaykin is an Associate Professor of Law at Northern Illinois University 
College of Law.  See Chaykin, supra note 207, at n.a. 
 216. Id. at 50. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See generally id. 
 220. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238 (1994). 
 221. Id. 
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resolution programs and provides that the liability of such mediators “shall be 
limited to willful or wanton misconduct.”222  Likewise in both Illinois and 
Utah, medical mediation board members are shielded from liability by an 
immunity statute except in the event the mediator acted in bad faith, with 
malicious intent, or exhibited willful disregard for rights, safety, or property of 
another.223 
In Iowa, a narrow mediator immunity statute prevented a party from 
bringing a negligence action against a Farm Mediation Service member where 
it was alleged that improper notice of the mediation was given denying the 
parties a fair opportunity to participate in foreclosure proceedings on their 
agricultural property.224  The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a 
claim due to the Iowa statute limiting farm mediation staff liability to actions 
in “bad faith, with malicious purpose, or in a manner exhibiting willful and 
wanton disregard of human rights, safety, or property.”225 
Like most immunity laws, the Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Illinois and Iowa 
statutes mentioned make an exception for reckless, willful misconduct.226  On 
the contrary, under California law for international commercial disputes the 
mediator is expressly not held liable “in an action for damages resulting from 
any act or omission in the performance of his or her role,” with no such 
exception given.227 
In addition to statutory protections, some courts protect mediators through 
the common law absolute quasi-judicial immunity doctrine.228  In Florida, any 
court-appointed mediator is granted judicial immunity “in the same manner 
and to the same extent as a judge.”229  A California court extended absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity to a psychologist who acted as a neutral third-party 
mediator in a child custody and abuse case.230  The court noted the need for 
alternative dispute resolution techniques to free-up clogged court schedules.231  
It stated that the job of a mediator is not as an advocate; rather it “involves 
 
 222. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-305 (1997). 
 223. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-15 (1996) (governing medical malpractice mediation boards); 
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/4 (West 1998) (mediation committee members for podiatric medical 
boards are exempt from civil liability damages except for willful or wanton misconduct). 
 224. Postma v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan of Sioux City, 74 F.3d 160 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 225. Id.  See also IOWA CODE § 13.16 (1995). 
 226. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-305; UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78-14-15; 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/4; IOWA CODE § 13.16. 
 227. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 1297.432 (West 1982). 
 228. See Chaykin, supra note 207, at 52-54 (discussing judicial immunity for mediators).  See 
also Wagshal v. Foster, 1993 No. 92-2072 WL 86499 (D.D.C. Feb. 5, 1993).  The Wagshal court 
stated that mediators “who are directly involved in ADR programs with express authority from 
the court may invoke the same protection” as the court.  Id. at *2. 
 229. FL. STAT. ANN § 44.107 (West 1997). 
 230. Howard v. Drapkin, 222 Cal. App. 3d 843, 848 (2nd Dist. 1990). 
 231. Id. at 857. 
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impartiality and neutrality, as does that of a judge . . . hence, there should be 
entitlement to the same immunity given others who function as neutrals in an 
attempt to resolve disputes.”232  The court therefore held that “absolute quasi-
judicial immunity is properly extended to these neutral third-parties for their 
conduct in performing dispute resolution services which are connected to the 
judicial process and involve . . . the arbitration, mediation, conciliation, 
evaluation or other similar resolution of pending disputes.”233 
The many statutes and judicial doctrines that grant immunity to mediators 
have led to the criticism that broad mediator immunity acts to “shield ‘bad’ 
mediator opinions” and creates a lack of professional accountability by 
mediators.234  Some have contended that the common law provides important 
protection for mediating parties and additional immunity legislation will not 
aid the quality of mediation as a whole.235 
IV.  CRITICAL ANALYSIS: WILL THE DRAFT ACT WORK? 
It is clear that the excessive regulation of mediation, over 2000 mediation 
related statutes,236 is confusing and unnecessary.  Therefore, it is difficult to 
argue against any attempt at simplification and unification.  However, the 
process of simplifying and unifying mediation regulation is complex and 
warrants a detailed look at exactly what it is that a uniform act should regulate 
and how it should be done. 
The Draft Act purports to regulate all mediation except the very simplest 
form where a mutual acquaintance aids two disputing persons in resolving an 
argument with no formalities (and likely without even the knowledge that a 
“mediation” is taking place).237  However, if the disputing parties enter into a 
written or electronically recorded agreement to have the mutual acquaintance 
aid in resolution of their dispute, then the Draft Act would apply.238  It also 
purports to apply where disputing parties seek the aid of someone who holds 
themselves out to be a mediator by trade.239  In such cases, the mediator is very 
likely to require a mediation agreement prior to offering services.240 
In both of these situations, the agreement entered into is voluntary and 
expresses what the parties intend to be the goals and procedures of the 
mediation sessions.  The contract could be comprehensive and cover issues 
such as confidentiality and attorney presence or it could merely state that the 
 
 232. Id. at 860. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Kovach & Love, supra note 22, at 104. 
 235. See Chaykin, supra note 207. 
 236. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 13.01. 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04. 
 238. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 3 (definitions). 
 239. See id. 
 240. See Devine, supra note 162, at 192. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1146 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:1121 
parties have agreed that the mediator is their choice to aid in resolving their 
dispute.  Either way, the contract reflects the voluntary nature of the process.241 
The need for regulation when a contractual relationship governs seems to 
be superfluous and unnecessary.  Contracting parties may not be aware that in 
addition to the contract entered into, regulations govern their mediation 
agreement.  If anything, this would add confusion to parties attempting to seek 
enforcement of the contract or damages for breach of it.  Further, as argued by 
many, the business world, supply and demand, and the traditional aspects of 
contract and tort law are likely sufficient to ensure that the parties to a 
contractual mediation receive fair and satisfying services.242 
Few states have attempted to regulate private mediation.243  Therefore, if 
the goal of the Draft Act is to “replace the hundreds of pages of complex and 
often conflicting statutes across the country with a few short pages of simple, 
accessible, and helpful rules,”244 as the drafters contend, then the Draft Act 
goes too far.  Regulating the private use of mediation will likely not 
“enhance . . . the expanded use of mediation”245 as hoped, but will interfere 
with a private contractual process that has inherent protections. 
The problem can be easily fixed by altering the Draft Act’s definitions of 
“disputant”246 and “mediator”247 as follows (with suggested deletions in 
brackets): 
“Disputant” means a person who participates in mediation and: 
(1) has an interest in the outcome of the dispute or whose agreement is 
necessary to resolve the dispute, and 
(2) is asked by a court, government entity, or mediator to appear for 
mediation [or entered an agreement to mediate that is evidenced by a 
record]. 
“Mediator” means an impartial individual of any profession or background, 
who is appointed by a court or government entity [or engaged by disputants 
through an agreement evidenced by a record]. 
 
 241. See Stulberg, Theory and Practice, supra note 76, at 88-89 (stating that “the mediation 
process is non-compulsory . . . [therefore], if the parties do not want to negotiate, the triggering 
mechanism for the entry of the mediator is absent”). 
 242. See Chaykin, supra note 207, at 52-54. 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.  But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238 (1994) 
(regulating mediation where “[b]efore or after the filing of a complaint, mediation may occur 
pursuant to law, a court order or a voluntary decision of the parties”). 
 244. Reuben & Rogers, supra note 1, at 18. 
 245. See Getty et al., supra note 90 (stating that the goal of the uniform mediation project is to 
“enhance, rather than interfere with, the expanded use of mediation and contribute to improving 
its effectiveness”). 
 246. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 3(a). 
 247. Id. § 3(d). 
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The deletion of any reference to voluntary mediation agreements free from 
court order or referral would remove the private mediation context from the 
umbrella of the Draft Act.  With these small changes, the Draft Act would 
more closely mirror the dispute contexts generally regulated by the states and 
would therefore advance the goals of clarifying and simplifying existing 
mediation law.248 
In addition to private mediation, many parties also find themselves 
engaged in mediation due to court referral or court order.249  In such cases, a 
new dimension to the expectations of the parties may arise.  The parties have 
already chosen the litigation process, but by virtue of the aspects of their 
dispute, it was referred or ordered to mediation in an attempt to be resolved by 
a mutual agreement rather than a court’s decision.250  When a mediation 
referral or order occurs, it appears that the court has an inherent duty to ensure 
that the time and efforts of the parties are not wholly in vain.251  For this 
reason, certain procedural guidelines seem necessary and prudent. 
In practice, court-connected mediation is the context for which nearly all 
existing state regulation applies.252  If the Draft Act provides the states a very 
basic structure and narrowly applicable guidelines as to court-connected 
mediation procedures, it will be a useful tool.  States that already have 
mediation legislation can repeal superfluous provisions and refer to the 
uniform law with supplementation for dispute-specific issues.  States with 
minimal mediation legislation will have a solid, organized base upon which to 
build a concise body of law. 
As can be seen by the discussion of various state laws in the previous 
sections of this Comment, few states have left court-connected mediation 
unregulated.253  On the other end of the spectrum, states such as California 
have hundreds of mediation statutes already in existence.254  As an 
accommodation to this wide variance, the mediation procedure provisions of 
the Draft Act255 are well chosen areas of regulation for court-connected 
mediation.  Disclosure  and representation rights are areas already regulated by 
the states256 and would therefore benefit from uniformity.  However, the states 
 
 248. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 1 (stating that the “guiding 
purpose of the drafting effort was to provide a simple and clear statute that would serve the 
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 250. Id. (noting that many states require courts to determine the appropriateness of a case for 
mediation prior to making a referral). 
 251. See Devine, supra note 162, at 206 (discussing the implications of mandatory 
mediation). 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 105-07. 
 253. See Section III. 
 254. See ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, app. B at 152-55. 
 255. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9. 
 256. See supra text accompanying notes 145-204. 
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also highly regulate immunity, but the issue is not addressed in the current 
version of the Draft Act.  Following, the disclosure, representation and 
immunity provisions will be discussed in turn. 
A. The Disclosure Provisions 
The current version of the Draft Act requires disclosure of conflicts of 
interest257 and, upon request, disclosure of qualifications.258  Comparing the 
Draft Act to state disclosure laws reveals three issues: (1) the burden for 
qualification disclosure is on the parties; (2) the parties have no guide as to 
what qualifies a mediator; and (3) relevant conflicts of interest are not 
enumerated. 
The first issue pertains to the disclosure of mediator qualifications.  Where 
the parties contract freely to have a particular mediator aid in resolution of 
their dispute without court intervention, the inherent nature of the contract is 
that the parties believe the mediator is qualified.259  Before agreeing, the 
parties have every opportunity to determine the mediator’s qualifications, and 
if disclosure is withheld, the parties are free to refrain from entering into the 
contract.  However, where the mediator is court-appointed, unknowing and 
unrepresented parties may assume that the mediator is qualified or would not 
have been appointed for their dispute.260  Therefore, the disclosure provision is 
less pertinent in a private mediation context than one involving a court-
connected mediator. 
Where the Draft Act’s disclosure provision does apply, as written, it places 
the burden of requesting disclosure on the parties.261  The few states that 
require disclosure of qualifications put the burden on the mediator rather than 
the parties.262  For instance, Louisiana requires that a mediator provide 
information regarding professional qualifications and fees upon receiving 
notice of appointment as a mediator.263 Requiring disclosure upon appointment 
places the mediator’s qualifications immediately out in the open for the parties’ 
review, and there can be no surprises for a party who did not know or did not 
think of asking until a problem arose or confidence fell. 
 
 257. Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9(a). 
 258. Id. § 9(b). 
 259. See Devine, supra note 162, at 192 (discussing the process of mediation and the 
importance of an introduction and agreement to mediate when the mediation is entered into 
voluntarily). 
 260. See generally Mandatory Mediation, supra note 105, at 1101 (stating that quality control 
is required in the context of mandatory mediation).  See also Harges, supra note 55, at 714 
(acknowledging that “states have a duty to ensure the quality of the individuals who serve as 
mediators”). 
 261. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9(b). 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61. 
 263. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4107(B) (West Supp. 1999). 
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Although the Draft Act properly requires disclosure of qualifications for 
court-connected mediators, placing the burden to request such disclosure on 
the parties is not justified.  Disclosure by the mediator early in the mediation 
process would aid in developing trust and the parties would more likely feel 
confident from the beginning that the mediator will be able to aid them in 
resolving their disputes.264  The potential damage that could be caused by 
unqualified mediators, time delays and increased costs for example, would be 
avoided by early, mandatory disclosure. 
The second issue is the Draft Act’s failure to address what education and 
experience ensure a qualified mediator.265  The issue is quite controversial and 
very complex when the numerous and varied types of disputes are taken into 
account.266  In addition, there is no convincing evidence as to what makes a 
good mediator.267  Therefore, the drafters are likely correct in avoiding an 
identification of strict standards.  Moreover, states may be reluctant to adopt a 
uniform act that drastically increases or decreases the minimum qualifications 
of mediators, and further, the mediation profession as a whole may be uprooted 
if across the board standards were suddenly and indiscriminately enacted.  
Nonetheless, among states with qualification standards there is consensus that 
some form of mediation or dispute resolution training increases mediator 
competency.268  Further, states generally agree that some experience or 
education in the field of the dispute is necessary.269  Most domestic disputes, 
for example, require some knowledge of social work, psychology, or 
counseling techniques.270  Some states have responded with mediation 
qualification standards requiring relative education or experience.271 
The problem posed by the Draft Act’s lack of standards is that with no 
standard for comparison, even when the parties request disclosure, there is no 
way for the parties to know if the qualifications are sufficient.  Therefore, it 
could be suggested that some reference to minimum standards should be 
included in the Draft Act.  However, since the goal of the Draft Act is to only 
regulate those areas common to all mediation,272 it would be more beneficial 
for the Draft Act to remain silent on the issue of qualifications, as it presently 
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does, and allow the states to establish subject-specific qualifications when 
necessary or prudent. 
Third is the issue of disclosure of conflicts of interest.  Unlike 
qualifications disclosure, conflicts of interest disclosure is more heavily 
regulated among the states, and the burden to disclose is normally on the 
mediator.273  State regulations go so far as to require a mediator to withdraw 
from the mediation if a conflict of interest either makes the mediator believe 
that impartiality is impossible or causes a party to request withdrawal.274 
The initial version of the Draft Act did not require disclosure of conflicts 
of interest unless, or until, a party or party representative requested 
disclosure.275  Placing the burden on the parties to request disclosure of 
conflicts of interests, as the initial version of the Draft Act did, may have led to 
disruptions and a lack of confidence in the mediation process when a party 
gained knowledge part way through the process that the mediator had a 
conflict of interest.  Therefore, the revisions in the current version of the Draft 
Act requiring automatic disclosure of a potential conflict of interest, without a 
specific request by a party,276 was a positive change. 
However, the remaining problem is that the Draft Act does not list 
potential conflicts of interest that must be expressly denied or disclosed by 
mediators.  An improvement, following the guide of the Model Standards of 
Conduct for Mediators,277 would be to outline specifically what information 
must be disclosed and require the mediator to expressly state whether the 
identified conflicts exist or not. 
B. Ensuring the Right to Representation 
The right to representation provision278 is the sole mediation procedure 
issue in which the Draft Act clearly answers a split in opinion among the 
states.  Although several states exclude attorneys at domestic mediations or 
leave the decision to the discretion of the mediator,279 the Draft Act provision 
would provide a uniform right ensuring that the parties have control over their 
representation regardless of the type of dispute. 
There may be criticism that this provision is self-serving for the legal 
profession; however, it will provide many benefits for mediating parties.  
Primarily, if a party feels more confident and is more likely to participate in 
mediation if counsel is welcomed, then the goals of mediation are advanced.280  
 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 146-57. 
 274. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-58.2 (Michie 1999). 
 275. Draft June 1999, supra note 1, § 4(a). 
 276. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9(a). 
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Counsel may be able to advise a mediating party as to the appropriate 
qualifications of a mediator and whether a perceived conflict of interest is an 
issue.  Counsel may also even the bargaining power between two parties, such 
as divorcing spouses, where one party naturally exerts influence over the other.  
In addition, counsel will be better equipped than an unrepresented party to 
evaluate an agreement reached through mediation if present at the 
negotiations.281 
Potential problems may arise when one party is represented and the other 
is not due to financial constraints.  In that instance, the bargaining power may 
actually be unbalanced due to the presence of counsel for only one side.  The 
Draft Act’s broad language upholding the right of non-legal representation282 
may mitigate the problem.  Having a professional counselor, well-trusted 
friend, or other non-legal advocate at the mediation sessions will allow a party 
without legal representation to build confidence and benefit from a second 
opinion.  Therefore, the right to representation provision appears to be a step in 
the right direction for quality mediation. 
Again, the distinction between private mediation and court-connected 
mediation can be raised.  In a private mediation, if the parties disagree as to 
whether attorneys should be present or not, the consequence is that the 
mediation will not go forward.  In a court-connected mediation, however, the 
consequence may be either an unsuccessful mediation because one party 
refuses to agree to a settlement or an unfair settlement because the parties were 
not fully informed prior to agreement.  In both cases, ensuring a party’s right to 
representation mitigates the effects of wasted time or an unfair settlement.  If 
the parties chose litigation first but were referred or ordered to mediation, a 
disallowance of representation would be inconsistent with the parties’ initial 
choice to be represented by counsel. 
C. The Lack of Limits on Mediator Liability 
The current version of the Draft Act fails to address mediator liability and 
immunity issues.  Previous versions allowed common law judicial immunity 
for court-connected mediators.283  In addition, the initial versions denied all 
immunity including exculpatory agreements and statutory immunity laws for 
private mediators who were therefore held fully responsible to the extent that 
civil liability allows.284  Unlike the other provisions of the Draft Act which put 
 
 281. See id. at 345 (stating that “lawyers often have an important role to play in protecting 
their clients during the course of a mediation and ensuring that any agreement that is reached is 
fair to the client or otherwise appropriate”). 
 282. See Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1, § 3(c). 
 283. See id. § 3(b). 
 284. See Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1, § 3(b). 
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private mediators and court-connected mediators on similar ground, the deleted 
immunity provisions made a prominent distinction.285 
In their protection of court-connected mediators, the previous versions of 
the Draft Act appeared to overlook the fact that many states provide for 
statutory immunity in addition to common law judicial immunity.286  Many 
state statutes grant full immunity to court-connected mediators with the 
exception of willful, wanton or reckless conduct.287  Statutory immunity grants 
more certainty to mediators and mediating parties than common law immunity 
insofar as there is no question as to whether it applies once enumerated in a 
statute.  It is claimed that court-connected mediators are more likely to be 
accountable for their actions due to court supervision;288 if this was the 
justification for upholding common law immunity for court-connected 
mediators, then the denial of statutory immunity would have been 
unwarranted. 
For private mediators, the marketplace and contract or tort laws are 
necessary checks on mediator accountability due to the absence of similar 
supervision and guidance provided in a court-connected context.289  The 
potential for claims of false advertising, breach of contract, fraud, invasion of 
privacy, defamation, and malpractice, holding mediators liable for their 
conduct, serve as necessary assurances of quality mediation.290  Therefore, the 
prohibition on immunity for private mediators in the previous versions of the 
Draft Act was proper.  However, because many states prohibit the use of 
exculpatory agreements in most contexts for public policy reasons291 an 
express prohibition on the use of such agreements should have been included 
in the Draft Act.  Exculpatory agreements eliminate the check that tort and 
contract liability supply and would therefore act conversely to the goal of 
quality mediation. 
Leaving the liability issue completely unaddressed, as the current version 
of the Draft Act does, contradicts the attempt to unify mediation regulation 
among the states.  As was discussed previously, several states have mediator 
immunity laws and the variance in scope and application is great.  Fine-tuning 
the provision to recognize the existing statutory as well as common law 
immunity for court-connected mediators and expressly prohibiting immunity 
 
 285. Compare id., with Draft Jan. 2000, supra note 1, §§ 3(a), 3(c). 
 286. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2238; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-15 (b) (1994); 225 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 100/4 (West 1998); and supra text accompanying notes 219-27. 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 219-27. 
 288. See Draft Dec. 1999, Reporter’s Notes, supra note 1, § 4(c). 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 213-18. 
 290. See Chaykin, supra note 207, at 51-52. 
 291. See Pendleton, supra note 207 (discussing Wisconsin’s general prohibition against 
exculpatory agreements). 
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for private mediators may be a greater step towards uniformity than 
eliminating the provision in its entirety. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The uniform mediation project is an effort to be commended.  It evolved 
from the institutionalization of mediation in the mid-1900s and the resulting 
abundance of state regulation that exists today.292  It is apparent that over 2000 
mediation related statutes293 are too many for a process praised for simplicity 
and informality.  Any attempt to reduce the complexity should be greatly 
supported. 
However, the drafting of a uniform act for mediation is a delicate process.  
A focus on the proper contexts to which a uniform act should apply is 
imperative.  This Comment has presented the argument that because private 
mediation is based on a voluntary agreement to mediate and is sufficiently 
protected by contract and tort law, the Draft Act need not regulate arenas of 
mediation beyond court-connected mediation.  This position is further 
advanced by the fact that most state statutes are limited to court-connected 
mediation scenarios. 
In the context of court referred or court ordered mediation, the Draft Act 
takes positive steps to ensure a quality process by providing for mediator 
disclosure and the right to representation.294  The disclosure provision makes a 
good effort at reducing conflicts of interest and providing for qualified 
mediators; however, it may be more effective if the burden for disclosure is 
shifted to the mediator rather than the parties.  The right to representation 
provision properly ensures that an attorney or other representative may 
accompany mediating parties if desired.  Finally, altering rather than 
eliminating the immunity provision in order to recognize the existing state 
statutes providing court-connected mediator immunity should be considered. 
The task of commencing and culminating the Draft Act project was and 
continues to be an awesome one.  Clearing the clutter of mediation regulation 
will require more than the predicted finalization of the Draft Act by the 
NCCUSL and ABA in February 2001.  The real test of its success in 
eliminating the plethora of mediation regulation will only be realized when the 
Draft Act is forwarded to the states for adoption.  Until then mediation 
regulation will remain in its unorganized, overlapping, incoherent and 
incomplete state. 
BRIDGET GENTEMAN HOY 
 
 292. See Section II. 
 293. ROGERS & MCEWEN, supra note 5, § 13:01. 
 294. See Draft Mar. 2000, supra note 1, § 9. 
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